By Stephen Smoot
As the world focused on government shutdowns and sombreros, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth declared war on one of the United States Army’s worst and most insidious enemies, interwar inertia.
What Hegseth did in his recent speech was to create a philosophical foundation for constant preparedness. He asked each general and admiral in the room to consider “would I want my eldest son, who is 15 years old, eventually joining the types of formations that we are currently wielding? If in any way the answer to that is no, or yes but, then we’re doing something wrong.”
Hegseth emphasized that every American should have confidence that if their child must go into battle, they fight alongside men and women who meet strict standards. Also that the greatest of responsibilities go to the leaders who have proven themselves the most.
Before this goes further, know this. The villain of this piece is the civilian politicians who neglect the military, or whose priorities replace the basic mission and vision of a military, which is to always be ready to confront America’s enemies.
For a number of reasons. the United States Army is the main victim of that historical trend through American history.
When the War of 1812 opened, the Army had declined considerably since the War of Independence and also the great victory by “Mad” Anthony Wayne at Fallen Timbers over the Shawnee and their allies, supported by the British. What few troops served barely had uniforms and carried half century old weapons.
In 1814, the Army fought in its main engagement. British forces disembarked from the Chesapeake Bay and drove toward Washington DC. These were far from the best of Britain; those men still fought Napoleon at this point. They swept aside the soldiers, burned the Capital, and were driven away by a hurricane strength storm.
The next year when Britain landed their first line, experienced forces at New Orleans, a collection of state militia units under a backwoods Indian fighter drove them from the field.
Conditions improved considerably after the formation of national military academies. The United States Military Academy at West Point formalized the training and education of officers. Commandants such as Robert E. Lee instilled the best traditions of professionalism and knowledge.
The USMA until 1861, however, was equally dedicated to teaching how to fight either for or against Napoleon. While overall, West Point was a vital addition that elevated the Army to one of the better prepared forces in the world, it looked backwards too much.
Proof is seen in the fact that Thomas Jackson and Ulysses S. Grant, two of the most innovative thinkers of the United States Civil War, were graded as barely capable by that school. Had Grant not been an excellent horseman (the only reason he graduated was his grades in that subject), he likely would have spent the war as a common soldier or running the family store.
Additionally, the John Brown Raid pushed the Commonwealth of Virginia into action on its own military front. Governor John Letcher and the General Assembly pledged to transform their “fuss and feathers” state militia into a fighting force trained and equipped like the regular Army.
Two years later, Thomas Jackson earned his nickname of “Stonewall” when he relied on the discipline and courage of those very militiamen to halt the Federal charge at First Bull Run/Manassas. Barely trained Federal troops, upon encountering resistance, sprinted back to DC. This reversed the course of the battle. Had the Federals won that fight, the Civil War becomes a footnote instead of a defining national experience.
In the Spanish-American War, US Army troops wore relatively comfortable cotton khaki uniforms as they deployed to Cuba to fight in the spring and summer of 1898. National Guard units raised to join them, however, were stuck with the Union Army’s old blue woolen uniforms.
All troops suffered from tropical disease and the poor condition of food rations in the difficult heat and humidity. More died from these issues than Spanish bullets. World War I soldiers thus benefited from a full regime of reforms put in place, making them likely the best prepared Army soldiers as they entered a major Great Power war.
Not so much those men who served in the Army prior to World War II. President Franklin D. Roosevelt strove to prepare every branch of the military for the war he rightfully hoped would come against the evil of National Socialism, but less desirous against the imperial appetites of the Empire of Japan.
His efforts battled many years of neglect. Even in the late 1930s, many US soldiers drilled with broom handles because of a lack of rifles. More seriously, peacetime internal politics had taken its toll on the promotion of “fighting” generals.
George Patton, who had shown initiative, courage, and ability in the Mexican incursion under President Woodrow Wilson, then in the First World War, was passed over for promotion over and over again. When the Army was finally ready to fight, Patton sat on the sidelines while Lloyd Fredendall, called by Army Chief of Staff George Marshall “one of the best” was in command on the ground after the November 1942 landing at Casablanca. Dwight Eisenhower wrote to Marshall that the general had alleviated his concerns about his competence.
At least until the fighting started. Then the Germans showed that Fredendall, what Hegseth might call a “go along to get along” type, saw himself thoroughly outclassed by the Germans. General George Patton, acerbic but aggressive, demanding, but diligent, bullying, but brilliant, and the only American war leader that the enemy truly feared, received command.
In the Pacific, the outbreak of war released Douglas Macarthur from his politically based exile to the Philippines, despite the fact that his decisions there resulted in a much worse defeat than should have occurred when the Japanese attacked there. His abilities, however, showed brilliance and nerve in both World War II and early in Korea (another war where the Army was caught off-guard.)
Not long after, the Army was ready in terms of men and material, but not strategy. The United States Army sent to battle in the mountains, jungles, and caves of Vietnam was perfectly built to win a war fought on the North European Plain, a land as different from Vietnam as Iowa is to West Virginia. It struggled until it adjusted to the terrain and particular conditions. Few Americans know that the Army actually decisively defeated, militarily anyway, the Vietcong in the Tet Offensive, but a full five years into the war.
What saved the Army from the continual lack of preparation brought by civilian politicians over centuries? The sheer courage of the American soldier and the officers who led them into battle. They held the line until the institution caught up with the war, their blood paying the cost of civilian priorities placed over those of the military and other poor decisions.
This remains a matter of particular importance to West Virginians. From the beginning of American history our men and women (whether from W. Va or the counties that would form it in 1863) enlist, serve, and die in combat in larger numbers per capita than any other state.
It is Mountaineer blood most often spilled in those distant lands in the cause of freedom.
When will the next major war come? Hopefully never, or at least in the far distant future. Hegseth emphasized that as the purpose of a military honed to its fighting edge at all times. Every great military strategist has agreed that it is better for a nation to be so strong in peacetime that its enemies will not dare to fight it and that has been the US overall approach since 1948.
If that war comes tomorrow, if Russian bombers attack Warsaw, if the Red Chinese Navy lands soldiers in Taiwan, then the Army has to be prepared to fight at its peak potential on day one.
The margin for error is gone.
Other services have their own challenges when it comes to maintaining readiness for war. They also engage more in peacetime when geopolitical conflicts arise.
As Hegseth tries to get away from the mentality that elevates Fredenhalls over Pattons and works to impose higher standards, it will continue to make many uncomfortable. Years of administrations placing social over fighting priorities, Hegseth claims, has weakened the fighting spirit, what the Secretary refers to as the “ethos” of the soldier.
As William T. Sherman stated, “war is hell.” Because the Army is always tasked to deploy there once it starts, for the good of it, the patriots who serve in it, and the nation, every formation must be ready.
